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“In the course of the Great Recession, already fragile black and Hispanic middleclass households lost huge amounts of wealth, which had often been painstakingly accumulated over many decades.”

The Great Recession and the
Destruction of Minority Wealth
Douglas S. Massey and Jacob S. Rugh

I

$151,000. (All values cited herein pertain to families and are in constant 2016 dollars.)
Wealth distributions are highly skewed, however: the median value (the 50th percentile) understates intergroup differences by taking little account
of high values in the upper tail of the distribution.
The absolute size of wealth differentials is better
captured using the mean value (the average of all
elements in the distribution). As of 2001, mean
household wealth for whites was $662,337 compared with only $97,930 for blacks, for a wealth
gap of $564,407. On average, then, whites were 5.2
times wealthier than blacks but only 1.6 times more
affluent as indexed by mean household income. We
thus get a very different perspective on class status
by focusing on wealth instead of income.
Wealth provides a critical cushion for the shocks
and vagaries of life under capitalism, a buffer that
the nation’s African Americans for the most part
lack. Whereas affluent black households are often
just a few paychecks away from the street, affluent
whites typically have a financial reserve that can
sustain them during periods of unemployment and
lost income. Owing to their relative lack of wealth,
the class status of high-earning blacks is much
more fragile than that of high-earning whites.
The same can be said of Hispanics. In 2001, mean
white wealth was 5.5 times that of Hispanics while
mean white income was only 1.4 times greater.
Historically, the accumulation of black wealth
was suppressed by discriminatory processes embedded in US society. In the twenty-first century,
black wealth is being actively destroyed by means
of an entirely new set of discriminatory structures.
In order to understand what happened to African
Americans during the Great Recession, and why
rates of black social mobility lag so far behind those
of whites, we first have to recognize this history.

t seems obvious now, but there was a time when
social scientists paid little attention to wealth as
a factor in America’s system of racial stratification. For many years, researchers focused primarily on black-white differentials in education, employment, and earnings; and
Social Mobility
in these dimensions progToday
ress was clearly being made.
From 1963 (just before the
Third in a series
passage of major civil rights
legislation) to 2001 (just after the economic boom
of the 1990s), the ratio of black-to-white median
household income rose from 33 percent to 64 percent. Over the same period, the black-white ratio
for high school graduates climbed from 51 percent to 89 percent, and the ratio for college graduates rose from 41 percent to 55 percent. Although
progress toward racial equality may have been
slow and fitful, the gaps were clearly narrowing
and advances in education and income seemed to
be creating a new black middle class.
In the 1990s, however, two books focused attention on the persistence of huge racial gaps with
respect to wealth: Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro’s Black Wealth/White Wealth (1995) and Dalton Conley’s Being Black, Living in the Red (1999).
Wealth is the total value of assets minus liabilities
at any point in time. For African American families in 1963 it was just 5 percent of median wealth
for white families; by 2001 the figure had risen
to just 16 percent. At that point, median family
wealth stood at $166,511 for whites and $26,149
for blacks, yielding a racial wealth gap of more
than $140,000. For Hispanics the gap was around
Douglas S. Massey is a professor of sociology and public
affairs at Princeton University. Jacob S. Rugh is an associate
professor of sociology at Brigham Young University.
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Wealth suppression
The principal source of wealth for most American households is homeownership, especially for
those outside the upper echelons of the income
distribution. Any social structure that affects
homeownership and home values thus plays an
outsized role in determining household wealth.
During the twentieth century, the most important
structures influencing the ability to accumulate
equity through homeownership were racial segregation in housing, racial segmentation in lending,
and racial discrimination in employment.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the vast
majority of blacks lived in the rural South. Within
70 years, the Great Migration brought about the
geographic diversification and urbanization of
black America. In 1900, 90 percent of all black
Americans lived in the South and just 20 percent
in urban areas, but by 1970, after seven decades of
mass out-migration, more than half lived outside
the South and 81 percent were urbanized. These
shifts were accompanied by sharp increases in the
residential segregation and spatial isolation of African Americans, especially in industrial cities of
the Northeast and Midwest.
The arrival of black migrants in northern cities
was initially resisted peacefully by white leaders
who sought to negotiate a withdrawal of black interlopers from white spaces, using social pressure
and financial incentives. When these methods
failed, whites typically resorted to violence. White
mobs gathered outside black-occupied homes and
unleashed an escalating spiral of attacks. If they
went unanswered, these attacks typically culminated in bombings and arson that ultimately
forced black residents to leave the neighborhood.
To avoid unseemly acts of violence and wanton property destruction, city councils sought to
segregate the races legally by enacting municipal
ordinances to set aside separate residential areas
for black and white residents. Introduced first in
Baltimore in 1910, such ordinances spread rapidly from city to city until 1917, when the US Supreme Court declared them unconstitutional—not
because they violated the constitutional rights of
black home seekers but because they infringed on
the rights of white property owners.
Black migration to the nation’s industrializing cities surged with the onset of World War I
in 1914, which shut down immigration from Europe and created nationwide labor shortages. The
migration accelerated further after 1917 when the
United States entered the war and the military

draft pulled white workers out of factories. Black
workers responded by moving in droves to take
advantage of the job vacancies.
As black workers and their families arrived in
northern cities, they initially settled in existing
black and racially mixed neighborhoods. Soon
these neighborhoods filled up and black settlers
spilled over into adjacent white districts. In response to these incursions, waves of communal
violence swept through urban America after 1917,
culminating in the great Chicago Riot of 1919.
Over the course of six days, roving gangs of white
vigilantes attacked any black person they encountered on the “white” side of the residential color
line. The uprising was finally quelled by imposition of martial law, but not before it resulted in
38 deaths and 500 injuries. More than 1,000 black
families were driven from their homes.
In the wake of the mayhem, the Chicago Real
Estate Board took action to institutionalize racial
discrimination in housing markets and thus avoid
the needless destruction of saleable properties.
Deed restrictions prohibiting rental or sale to African Americans already existed but were seen as
inefficient because they could be applied only on
a property-by-property basis. To expand the scale
of racial exclusion, Chicago realtors invented a
new device known as the restrictive covenant—a
contract among white property owners committing them collectively not to rent or sell housing
to African Americans. Once a majority of property
owners in a covered area had signed, the covenant
became legally binding and violators could be
sued in court to force compliance.
In 1927, the Board went further by creating a
model covenant that could be used by realtors
throughout the nation. Four years earlier, the National Association of Real Estate Boards had written a new code of ethics for brokers, stating that “a
realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood . . . members of any race
or nationality . . . whose presence will clearly be
detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.” With these tools in place, racial discrimination was embedded in the structural organization of housing markets throughout the United
States, driving levels of black segregation to unprecedented heights.

Institutionalized segregation
With the onset of the Great Depression in 1929
and the advent of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal
in the 1930s, the federal government became more
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centrally involved in the US political economy. In
of “redlining” throughout the nation, channeling
the process, it institutionalized racial segregation
home investment away from cities and from all
in the public as well as the private sphere, most
black neighborhoods for decades to come.
Owing to the privations of the Great Depression
forcefully through the workings of three federal
and the exigencies of World War II, these proviagencies: the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,
sions had little effect on the spatial organization of
which was created in 1933 to shield homeowners
urban areas through the 1930s and 1940s. From
from foreclosure; the Federal Housing Adminis1950 to 1970, however, they undergirded a mastration (FHA), established in 1934 to make homesively racialized reorganization of urban geograownership more widely available; and the Veterphy: whites took advantage of federal subsidies to
ans Administration (VA), which implemented the
GI Bill of Rights, enacted in 1944 to support the
flee central cities for cheaper and newer homes in
reintegration of war veterans into civilian life.
booming suburbs as masses of southern blacks entered the cities to occupy the homes and neighborAll three agencies created lending programs
hoods they left behind. Since the racially changing
that insured private mortgages for up to 90 percities were cut off from mortgage lending and other
cent of a loan’s value, as long as the issuing bank
investments by public policy and private practice,
conformed to certain federally mandated criteria,
the vacated homes were purchased mainly by white
such as small down payments and long amortientrepreneurs, who then leased or “sold” them to
zation periods. The government also stated that
blacks on usurious terms.
the loans could only be used for the purchase of
Rather than being offered standard mortgagnew single-family homes built on large lots with
es, black home buyers were forced into exploiwide setbacks, thereby channeling home investtive land installment contracts and rent-to-own
ment away from city centers where room for new
schemes. Such agreements reconstruction was limited and the
quired them to make inflated
housing stock was dominated by
monthly payments over time
row houses, apartment buildBlack neighborhoods
in expectation of receiving title
ings, and multipurpose strucwere explicitly targeted
to the home when the contract
tures.
for predatory lending.
In addition, federal rules reended. In the interim, the seller
quired an evaluation of the credheld title to the property and
itworthiness of borrowers, one
could evict buyers for missed or
that took into account their purported effect on
incomplete payments. Since the earnings of Afrithe stability of neighborhoods. Adopting practices
can Americans remained tenuous due to rampant
already established in the real estate industry, the
labor-market discrimination during the 1950s and
government prohibited loans to “inharmonious
1960s, missed payments were hardly unusual. Not
racial or nationality groups.” This prohibition was
only was such discrimination perfectly legal, it
sporadically applied to other groups, but always
also was supported by New Deal legislation that
to blacks. The FHA underwriting manual stated
permitted segregated unions with separate labor
that “if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is
contracts for blacks and whites.
necessary that properties shall continue to be ocEven those African Americans fortunate enough
cupied by the same social and racial classes.” To
to complete a contract successfully had little
this end, the FHA insisted on the use of racially
chance of building substantial home equity. Due to
restrictive covenants, a policy that also applied to
institutionalized discrimination in the real estate
VA loans.
and banking industries, once a neighborhood beBoth lending programs required neighborgan to turn black it was redlined and cut off from
hoods to be assessed. For this purpose they relied
future investment, leading to sagging demand,
on “residential security maps” developed by the
lagging property values, and a deteriorating housHome Owners’ Loan Corporation. These maps
ing stock. With access to home equity blocked,
color-coded urban neighborhoods according to
black families found it extremely difficult to build
their stability and suitability for federally insured
wealth through most of the twentieth century.
loans. Green indicated full eligibility, yellow sigIn essence, the structural organization of lendnaled caution, and red meant ineligibility. Invariing and housing markets in the postwar era meably, black neighborhoods were coded red. In this
chanically produced low rates of black homeway, federal policy institutionalized the practice
ownership and low values for the few homes that
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African Americans did manage to acquire. At the
end of the 1980s, the rate of homeownership for
blacks was only 42 percent and the mean home
value was just $131,000, whereas for whites the
respective figures were 68 percent and $215,000.
In light of these data, it is unsurprising that average black wealth in 1989 constituted just 18
percent of average white wealth, even though the
average black household income by then had risen
to 62 percent of the average white income.

Financial targeting
Although a series of civil rights laws was enacted between 1964 and 1977 to end legal segregation and ban open discrimination in markets,
new structures of racial exploitation quickly arose
to take their place. A regime of mass incarceration put a growing percentage of black men behind bars. Criminal records reduced employment
rates and earnings, exacerbating the suppression
of black income and savings. At the same time, a
wholesale restructuring of mortgage lending not
only suppressed black wealth but actively served
to destroy it. However, while the transformation of
mortgage lending in the 1930s and 1940s was led
by the government, during the 1980s and 1990s it
was led by the private sector.
The trigger for this transformation was the
invention and spread of derivative investments
known as collateralized debt obligations, and in
particular mortgage-backed securities. Before the
1980s, most mortgages were directly issued by
consumer banks to individual borrowers. After the
1980s the mortgage industry moved from direct
to indirect lending, working through independent
brokers that originated mortgages and then sold
them to investment banks for repackaging into
securities. The new financial instruments were
created by bundling multiple mortgages together
to generate an aggregate stream of mortgage payments, which was then used to underwrite bonds.
This process is called securitization.
Before the advent of mortgage-backed securities, the number of mortgages that could be issued
at any time was limited by the quantity of deposits
that banks had on hand to lend. Now, the potential
number of mortgages was limited only by what the
market for these securities could bear. During the
1990s and early 2000s, that market seemed limitless. Although government-sponsored enterprises
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also issued
these securities, the boom was led by private entities, which dominated the market.

In order to diversify risks, mortgages of varying
quality were organized into different “tranches,”
with the highest-quality loans being placed in the
top tranches and lower-quality loans in the bottom
tranches. This practice created a strong demand
for risky subprime mortgages in order to create
balanced risk portfolios. Subprime loans carried
higher interest rates to compensate lenders for
the greater risk they were presumably incurring.
These loans were also more profitable for intermediaries whose remuneration depended on the gap
between the prevailing interest rate and that paid
by borrowers, known as the yield spread.
Once a portfolio of mortgages was constructed to back a saleable security, the soundness of
the bonds was assessed by a small number of
credit-rating agencies. They had an incentive to
give bonds a high rating, since they were paid fees
by the firms that wished to sell them. Over time
the demand for mortgage-backed securities grew
to a point where risky, low-quality loans comprised an ever-larger share of the tranches, and
rating agencies came under increasing pressure
to overlook this fact. Both they and the financial
firms had a strong interest in branding the bonds
as “investment-grade,” a designation required by
pension funds and many institutional investors.
In this context, black borrowers in black neighborhoods were no longer prospects to be avoided;
they had become attractive targets for exploitation. After decades of economic exclusion, African Americans were perceived as financially unsophisticated, gullible, and easy marks for peddlers
of deceptive financial products. In addition, civil
rights advances and the economic boom of the
1990s had increased the rate of black homeownership from 42 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in
2005. Black migration from the rural South ceased
around 1970, leaving black households in cities to
age in place, and by the early twenty-first century
many had come to own their homes outright, creating a significant cache of wealth.
Owing to black residential segregation, of
course, this tempting pool of housing wealth was
concentrated in specific neighborhoods, making
the marketing of exploitive lending products easy
and efficient. Black neighborhoods were explicitly
targeted by mortgage brokers, retail banks, and
other financial organizations for “predatory lending.” The predation entailed steering low-income
borrowers into home loans they could not really
afford, and selling affluent borrowers, who otherwise qualified for prime loans, on more costly and
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risky subprime loans. These lending products not
from 2000 to 2008, which confirmed the predaonly carried higher yield spreads; they had other
tory nature of the lending to blacks and quantiexploitive features such as adjustable interest rates
fied the costs to the city’s black community. Black
(to ensure that if market rates rose the yield spread
borrowers were systematically steered into higherwould be maintained) and prepayment penalties to
cost loans, with monthly payments that were 5.3
discourage early repayment and preserve the cash
percent higher than those of similarly qualified
flows backing the securities.
whites after taking into account a host of backBy the mid-1990s, up to 35 percent of those reground characteristics. As a result, the average
ceiving subprime loans were actually eligible for
black homeowner spent $550 more per year in
prime loans; near the height of the housing boom
mortgage payments, which would accumulate to
in 2006, that share had risen to more than 60 permore than $16,000 if the loan went to term.
cent. African Americans were conspicuously overBlack borrowers were also 50 percent more likerepresented among the recipients of these loan
ly to be channeled into high-risk loans. Because of
products and were more likely to be using them to
their higher costs and risks, they were 70 percent
extract equity rather than purchase a new home.
more likely to end up in foreclosure. As of 2008,
The targeting of black neighborhoods for preda215 black borrowers in the city had already fortory lending came to be known as “reverse redlinfeited $2.4 million in wealth through completed
ing.” It became the characteristic mechanism for
foreclosures.
extracting wealth from black communities in the
With two colleagues, we conducted a content
early twenty-first century.
analysis of a random sample of depositions filed
Black neighborhoods were blanketed with billin four lawsuits alleging discrimination against US
financial institutions, including those directly inboards and posters offering to turn their homes
volved in lending to Baltimore’s
into ready cash. Black zip codes
black community. A total of
were saturated with bulk mail
some 220 sworn depositions
offering loans with no down
Federal policy institutionalized
were analyzed and classified
payments and low teaser rates.
the practice of “redlining”
independently by two invesTelephone exchanges linked to
throughout the nation.
tigators, and 76 percent were
black neighborhoods (the first
judged to provide clear evithree digits after the area code)
dence of targeted discriminawere deluged with recorded
tion against black borrowers and/or black neighand personal calls offering to help customers
borhoods, as the following quotations indicate:
“build wealth.” Black business owners were paid
to turn client lists over to mortgage brokers, and
[The firm] discriminated against minority loan
black clergy were induced to vouch for their lendapplicants by not offering them their better or
newer products which had lower fixed interest
ing services in return for contributions.
rates and fees.
As a result of this racialized targeting, the deElderly African American customers were

gree of black segregation in 2000 emerged as the
thought to be particularly vulnerable and were
strongest single predictor of the number and rate
frequently targeted for subprime loans with high
of home foreclosures across metropolitan areas
interest rates.
between 2006 and 2008. Its effect was twice that
It was the practice . . . where I worked to target
of the next closest predictors (the jobless rate and
African Americans for subprime loans. It was
average credit rating). Although some assert that
generally assumed that African American cusattempts to boost minority homeownership under
tomers were less sophisticated and intelligent
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) helped to
and could be manipulated more easily into a
increase the risk of foreclosure, the share of loans
subprime loan with expensive terms than white
made by CRA-covered lenders had no effect in precustomers.
dicting the number or rate of foreclosures.
Vulnerable hispanics
Bias in baltimore
Although black borrowers and neighborhoods
Baltimore is among the nation’s most segregatwere the first to be targeted for predatory lended metropolitan areas, with a long history of dising, as the housing boom continued Hispanics
crimination. We conducted a detailed analysis of
were increasingly victimized as well, especially
mortgages sold to blacks and whites in Baltimore
in suburban areas of the “sand states” of Arizona,
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California, Florida, and Nevada. The longstanding
black-white divide in housing meant that Hispanics living in and around historically black areas also
became victims of subprime lending. Many historically black areas—South Los Angeles, North Las
Vegas, Chicago’s South Suburbs, Central Orlando,
South Mountain in Phoenix, the South Bronx—
were predominantly Latino by 2008.
Hispanics were also vulnerable because they
had a younger age structure (yielding a higher rate
of household formation) and more young children
(creating a demand for newer suburban housing).
They were socially connected to other immigrants
in the United States who were themselves in housing distress and unable to help. Many had relatives
abroad who depended on remittances, placing a
greater strain on household income.
Many Hispanic households also contained one
or more undocumented workers. Rising deportations during the Bush and Obama administrations
accelerated foreclosures by removing these key
sources of household income needed to keep up
with mortgage payments. Between 2004 and 2013,
some 23 percent of Latino homeowners had lost
their homes to foreclosure, compared with 19 percent of blacks, 11 percent of Asians, and 9 percent
of non-Hispanic whites.

The hardest hit
The end result of this predatory lending to
blacks and Hispanics was a pronounced boom
and bust cycle for wealth. From 1983 to 2007, the
wealth of both groups rose as home prices inflated
and the risks of predatory lending were obscured.
Mean black family wealth rose from $67,000 to
$95,000 between 1983 and 1998. After a brief
pause, black wealth then increased very markedly, peaking at $156,000 in 2007 on the eve of the
Great Recession. But owing to the excessive costs
and risks imposed on blacks because of predatory
lending, and a lack of non-housing investments,
when the housing bubble burst their apparent
gains in wealth evaporated. Black wealth fell to
a nadir of $102,000 in 2013, marginally above
where it had been in 2001. Although black wealth
recovered somewhat by 2016, it still remained below the level achieved back in 2007.
The ups and downs of Hispanic wealth were
even more extreme. Hispanic families in 1983 had
only $63,000 in mean net wealth in 1983, some
$4,000 below that of blacks. By 1998, however, the

figure had risen to $129,000, about $34,000 above
mean black wealth. After declining to $120,000 in
2001 in the wake of the dot-com recession, it rocketed to $216,000 in 2007 before plummeting to
$111,000 in 2013. As with blacks, Hispanic wealth
recovered somewhat by 2016, but remained well
below its earlier peak.
As of 2016, mean white wealth was 6.6 times
that of blacks and 4.8 times that of Hispanics. In
contrast, average white household income was
only 1.5 and 1.3 times greater than that of blacks
and Hispanics. From 1983 to 2016, the absolute
size of the average wealth gap for blacks rose from
$257,000 to $780,0000, while that for Hispanics
grew from $261,000 to $728,000, as both groups
fell further behind whites.
In the course of the Great Recession, already
fragile black and Hispanic middle-class households lost huge amounts of wealth, which had
often been painstakingly accumulated over many
decades. As a consequence, both groups now have
diminished resources as they face a political context that is increasingly hostile to civil rights guarantees in principle and civil rights enforcement in
practice. Wall Street’s interest in mortgage-backed
securities is reviving and financiers are moving to
create new collateralized debt obligations from car
loans, payday advances, credit-card debt, student
loans, and other financial products often sold on
exploitive terms. Residential segregation and the
predatory lending it facilitates thus remain at the
core of America’s system of racial stratification,
and there is little hope of protection from Donald
Trump’s administration.
Although Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
in 2010 in an effort to curtail the excesses that
brought on the Great Recession, its provisions are
now being rolled back under Trump. Organizations such as the Center for Responsible Lending
and the National Fair Housing Alliance combat
predatory lending and discriminatory real estate
practices, but the reach and resources of these
nonprofits do not match the financial industry’s.
Moreover, they are getting less help from federal
authorities than ever. Emblematic of the current
climate is Housing and Urban Development Secretary Ben Carson’s decision to remove language
from his department’s mission statement referring
to “inclusive communities” that are “free from discrimination.”
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